The paper deals with the validity of constitutional pluralism as a constitutional theory for the European Union and a paradigm for the understanding of EU law in the current times of crisis. It reconstructs the way in which constitutional pluralism came to the fore, the different ways in which the theory was presented, and considers historical criticism it has faced. It then looks at the anomalies that, allegedly, cannot be explained today by constitutional pluralism as a paradigm, linked to the current economic and political crises in the Union. The reconstruction of the debate is complemented with reflections on both the descriptive and normative validity of EU constitutional pluralism's claims.
Introduction
This special issue deals with competing paradigms for EU law in times of crisis. The basic idea is to question paradigms of EU integration in the context of current multifaceted critical situations, contribute to a better understanding of their impact on the nature and identity of the Union, and reflect on their applications and implications.
The theory of EU constitutional pluralism is surely one of the most successful paradigms for the explanation of EU law development in the last decades: it was termed by a leading scholar in the field, himself considered a pluralist (Jaklic 2014; Weiler 2012: 13) , as a new 'orthodoxy', as 'the only party membership card' capable today to 'guarantee a seat at the high tables of the public law professoriate' (Weiler 2012: 8) . Thus, it is obvious to question its soundness, especially because the crisis added to its classic discontents new critical voices pleading for its 'unsustainability' (Kelemen 2016) .
The connection of the terms paradigm and crisis cannot but lead to the adoption of certain specific epistemological coordinates in such an endeavour. Thomas Kuhn famously suggested designating as a paradigm what the members of a certain scientific community have in common, namely the whole of ideas, techniques and values shared by the members of an epistemic community; and to consider that a scientific revolution occurs when members of an epistemic community encounter anomalies that cannot be explained by the accepted paradigm, so to put such a paradigm in crisis (Kuhn 1962) .
If, as suggested by Weiler, constitutional pluralism has been an orthodoxy for EU legal scholars, at least for a while, and for many such a theory is now put in crisis by the crisis, we will adopt Kuhnian coordinates to shape this essay as follows.
In the first chapter, we will briefly reconstruct the way in which constitutional pluralism came to the fore, the different ways in which the theory was presented, how it became a paradigm. We will also consider historical criticism it has faced since the beginning of its journey in the world of ideas. In what follows, we will look at the anomalies that, allegedly, cannot be explained today by constitutional pluralism as a widely-accepted paradigm. In the second chapter, in particular, we will look at the debate which arose around recent measures to resolve the Eurozone crisis and some famous judicial cases which are related:
this is the first area of law in which doubts about the possible 'demise of the pluralist E -124 robustness, Maastricht-Urteil shaped a new doctrinal agenda, which was equally a development and refinement of the lines of cases cited above. Thus, constitutional pluralism was forged as a development and refinement of constitutionalist readings of the European Communities, then probably a stronger paradigm than now (Chiti, Teixeira 2013; De Witte 2015) . The Maastricht-Urteil was probably the first judgment in which, instead, 'the superiority of the national constitutional model on the integrative process' XVI was plainly predicated, in a way in which, in comparison with the classic tenets of the European Court of Justice jurisprudence, XVII the idea of a hierarchy between (certain) national constitutions and EU law appeared inherently unstable, or unresolved, and destined to remain so. The idea of a potential stability in instability was conceived. According to Wittgenstein's seventh proposition, 'whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent' (Wittgenstein 1922);  and for comparative constitutional scholars like Foley, the lesson to be learned from constitutional history is precisely that it is best not to comment on the ultimate questions concerning sovereignty (Foley 1989; Bin 2012: 54 et seq.; Bin 2014: 11) . In the wake of what appeared to be a stable coexistence of competing narratives on how to conceptualize the plurality of constitutional sources in Europe and their relationship, constitutional pluralists came to the fore and argued that no one should pretend to be able to give the definitive word on the point of prevalence of one order over another (Bin 2014: 11) . After all, 'the habitual willingness to defer indefinitely consideration of deep constitutional anomalies, for the sake of preserving the constitution from the severe conflict that would arise from attempts to remove them, represents the core of a constitutional culture' (Foley 1989: 10) : and the constitutional culture of Europe could precisely rest, for pluralists, on such an apparently unstable, or unresolved, solution, as a decision not to decide. 
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In legal terms, the theory was appropriate, since it was able to capture the plurality of constitutional norms at stake after the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty, and the magnitude of the potential constitutional conflicts threatened at the time by judgments such as Maastricht-Urteil and the French and Spanish cases of 1992. The latter ultimately proved to be unproblematic: their respective constitutions were easily amended, and the Treaty was soon ratified; when conflicts did come, it was in the form of 'soft' constitutional conflicts (Baquero Cruz 2007: 1). The German case was different: it came in the form of a potentially 'hard' conflict, threatening disobedience, evoking the possibility of unilateral withdraw (Baquero Cruz 2007: 1), but eventually led to ratification and adherence, even though by placing strong conditionality on the table (never overruled). It left the idea of a potential stability in instability.
In political terms the theory was captivating, since it captured the political zeitgeist of the time, with the first signs of popular disaffection in the French and Danish referenda. Constitutional pluralism helped to reinvigorate the idea that both the European Union and national legal orders could be conceived of as constitutional systems, and could coexist even though it was impossible, in political terms, to answer that 'old question' on whether Europe needed a formal constitution, and how to reconcile competing claims of authority in a stable way (Poiares Maduro 2003; Poiares Maduro 2012: 67-68 Maduro 2012), focusing in particular on how the theory, through its contestation of finality and conclusiveness, highlights the role of particular institutions which take decisions of constitutional significance, and on the ways in which those institutions should act and interact.
In sum, Poiares Maduro recently identified three major claims of constitutional pluralism as a constitutional theory of EU: the empirical, the normative and the thickly normative (Poiares Maduro 2012). The analysis of these is vital in understanding how the theory proved decisive, for many, in conceptualizing European legal and political challenges of the last decades as discussed above, and useful to reflect, later, on current suspected anomalies.
The empirical claim is the 'starting point' of the theory. It develops from a consensus over the fact that the EU is governed by a form of constitutional law, XXV and identifies the phenomenon of a plurality of constitutional sources and claims of ultimate authority which create a context for potential constitutional conflicts that are not hierarchically regulated.
This is particularly obvious in the case of EU law, where the multiplication of competing legal sites and jurisdictional orders is evident, and a discursive practice between the European Court of Justice and national constitutional courts, aimed at reducing the risks of E -127 therefore descriptive in nature: its basic tenet is that 'constitutional pluralism is what best describes the current legal reality of competing constitutional claims of final authority among different legal orders (belonging to the same legal system) and the judicial attempts at accommodating them'; it is a claim where EU and national legal orders can be construed as normatively autonomous but also institutionally bound by the adherence of their respective actors to both legal orders (Poiares Maduro 2012: 69-74 (Foley 1989) . This claim would fit, here again, particularly for the EU case: for here the fact is that the recognition of the legitimacy of the EU constitutional claim, and the idea that competing constitutional claims such as the supranational and the national ones are of equal legitimacy or, at least, cannot be balanced against each other once and for all. As MacCormick put it, in a system of constitutional pluralism 'it is possible that each [constitutional order] acknowledge the legitimacy of every other within its own sphere, while none asserts or acknowledges the constitutional superiority over another' (MacCormick 1999: 102 et seq.) . In this sense, it would be desirable to embed -explicitly or not -pluralist thinking within EU law: and the best way to do it could actually vary, ranging from the idea that national courts should explicitly take account of EU interests in interpreting national law (Poiares Maduro 2007) to the idea that 'EU law should be selfpolicing' (Davies 2012: 269) , and it should adopt a more pluralist approach and prevent EU law becoming a threat to national constitutions (Kumm 2005).
The thickly normative claim of the theory is the following: in the current state of affairs, pluralism provides a closer approximation to historical ideals of constitutionalism than either national constitutionalism or a form of EU constitutionalism modeled after national constitutionalism. It would be, in general, the best representation of the ideals of constitutionalism. This broad claim is based on the idea that pluralism is an inherent ingredient of constitutionalism, and that it can be decisive, facing today's 'changing nature For our purposes, it is important to note that these views were endorsed by many in the context of EU studies, XXVI although of course not necessarily in a complete way and therefore wholly supporting the three claims suggested by Poiares Maduro. Theoretically, it is possible to differentiate and divide them, and endorse a descriptive/empirical version of EU constitutional pluralism without backing, on the normative plan, the other arguments on its appropriate nature.
The same can be said for the critical arguments faced by constitutional pluralism.
In the last two decades, constitutional pluralism became a paradigm, an orthodoxy in the study of EU law: still, it attracted, from the beginning, critical remarks by renowned authors.
To name a few, Loughlin termed constitutional pluralism an oxymoron, 'used to make a full-fronted assault on the conceptual edifice of public law' and its basic tenets, including 
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Davies contested the idea of constitutional pluralism as a description of an only apparently unstable, or unresolved, balance between competing national and supranational claims. He acknowledged the 'initial attractiveness' of the theory, which can seem 'more convincing than one which concedes to the claims of one side or the other'; yet he deemed the symmetry of the situation 'illusory' (Davies 2012: 270) . He argued that national courts control the outcome of actual cases, and in most cases still consider that their ultimate allegiance, in the event of conflict, is to national constitutions and national supreme courts; conversely, EU law may assert in principle, but it lacks the means to enforce its assertions. This last is in fact the point to be emphasized and unpacked here. All the classic discontents of constitutional pluralism were radically critical on all its claims, within their respective logics and in their logical order. Authors like Loughlin, Somek, Davies, Baquero Cruz, have always contested the basic tenets of the theory, and therefore the adequacy of the descriptive/empirical claims on pluralism on the nature of the competing claims for final constitutional authority in Europe. As we saw, they either contested the idea of a constitutional narrative for European integration itself, or in any case contested the openness of the debate on the Kompetenz-Kompetenz, and the possibility itself of heterarchy as a veritable constitutional principle replacing hierarchy.
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This is perfectly legitimate, of course, precisely because we are talking of different paradigms for the understanding of the same phenomena.
But the nature of such critical views must be separated from other more recent critical remarks presented as new anomalies which the paradigm of constitutional pluralism would not be able to explain.
The first alleged anomaly: the unsustainability of constitutional pluralism in times of crisis
Today constitutional pluralism is facing different kinds of criticism. In paradigmatic terms, these new critical remarks are presented not as radical objections to the adequacy of the theory for the understanding of the relationship between EU law and national constitutional law. On the contrary, they are presented as a discussion on the 'unsustainability' of the theory in present times (Kelemen 2016 ), for we would face anomalies that could not be explained by the accepted paradigm, anomalies that are capable of pushing the paradigm into crisis. 
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'exclusively according to German constitutional law', and not 'according to EU law', could be performed, leading to disobedience towards the supranational judicial dicta and a declaration of inapplicability of the OMT program in Germany.
XXXI As we know, the European Court of Justice did not acquiesce, and sent back a preliminary ruling explaining how the OMT program was sufficiently connected to the ECB's monetary policy mandate as to fall within its proper competences, and, in general terms, reasserted its own claim of constitutional rule, its Kompetenz-Kompetenz. E -132 predicated by Poiares Maduro 2007), at least by talking past one another and ignoring the points on which their jurisprudence actually conflicted (Kelemen 2016: 146; Sarmiento 2012) . But in his opinion such stability of instability could not be a proper solution: 'while direct conflict between EU and national constitutional orders has been avoided for a long time indeed, it was inevitable that such conflict would emerge eventually' (Kelemen 2016: 146) . With Gauweiler, the psychological 'parallel play' inherent in constitutional pluralism came to a close, especially given the magnitude of the interests at stake: the continued existence of the whole architecture built for the 'survival of the Eurozone' was at risk ( (Kelemen 2016: 146, 147 ).
This last point links Kelemen's arguments with the general remarks of another leading scholar, Daniel Sarmiento. In a recent essay -framed in the conversational style of a blog post but with his usual brilliance -he suggested that 'academics that seemed quite comfortable with the pluralist narrative now seem quite uncomfortable with it', including himself: the 'pluralist movement', in his view, might be 'in retreat', since it 'dramatically crashed against the wall of reality' (Sarmiento 2015).
What was the anomaly found by Sarmiento to challenge, in such a harsh way, the validity of the paradigm to which he himself adhered? In his view, pluralism provided 'a nice theoretical backdrop' to developments taking place, for example, during the EAW saga, when, as said, a large number of constitutional and supreme courts engaged in a lively debate about the constitutional limits of EU Law (Pollicino 2008): but the niceness of the theory was in its 'harmless' nature, since, 'in the nineties and 2000's', when 'pluralism was nice', the questions at stake were of no existential importance. After all, questioning the European arrest warrant could neither destroy the EU, nor would it undermine the authority of the Court of Justice; the same could be said, in his view, to those very principled decisions from constitutional courts deciding on the constitutionality of reform Treaties, imposing strict conditions but, ultimately, green-lighting their ratification by Parliaments, as in cases such as Maastrich-Urteil and Lissabon-Urteil discussed above (Sarmiento 2015) . Today, the situation would be different: supranational agreements 'entered by Member States in the European Council, in the Eurogroup, the actions of the troika, etc., seemed untouchable for national courts that had been much more concerned in the past about much more irrelevant EU acts', so that pluralism could no longer explain the way in which constitutional and supreme courts actually deal, in today's context of fear, with the authority of EU Law (Sarmiento 2015). Moreover, when pluralism came back to the game, in cases such as the challenge of the Bundesverfassungsgericht to the OMT program, it did so 'with a force and consequences much more destructive than ever seen in the past', and therefore in a tremendously dangerous way that makes it undesirable: 'in the midst of the worse economic and political crisis the EU has gone through, it might seem too dangerous to play' with pluralist stances, and therefore wise to go back to an unconditional version of supremacy (Sarmiento 2015).
All in all, considering both Kelemen's and Sarmiento's points, it seems to me that these new arguments against constitutional pluralism are flawed, but interesting and worthy of consideration. They embody the current zeitgeist in which constitutional pluralism as a paradigm is surely under scrutiny. They must be scrupulously analyzed to understand their differences compared to the classic criticism faced by constitutional pluralism that we already summarized.
In this sense, one can start by highlighting that Kelemen's argument is strictly normative. In his manifesto, he actually acknowledges the descriptive validity of pluralism, or, in Poiares Maduro's words, the validity of its empirical claim. In his words, '(c)onstitutional pluralism may describe the situation in the EU at least since the FCC's Maastricht judgment' (Kelemen 2016: 146) , and 'constitutional pluralists like Miguel Poiares Maduro are surely right in their empirical claim that today, given the unresolved impasse between the Court of Justice and national constitutional courts, constitutional pluralism 'best describes the current legal reality of competing constitutional claims of final authority among different legal orders (belonging to the same legal system) and the judicial attempts at accommodating them' (Kelemen 2016: 145) . He also acknowledges that mutual accommodation is sometimes reached openly, by judicial cross-fertilization, and sometimes merely through selective silences (Kelemen 2016: 146) : and this is, again, part of classic teachings from comparative constitutional history on how 'latest questions concerning sovereignty' are treated (Foley 1989; Bin 2012 : Bin 2014 , and therefore the basis of constitutional pluralist thinking. Kelemen's preoccupation is on another plane, and its criticism is therefore very different from Loughlin's, Somek's or Baquero Cruz's: his idea is that pluralism is today, with cases such as Gauweiler, an unsustainable position, dangerous for the correct unfolding of European integration. 
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Having clarified his points in this way, it seems less odd that another author published, on the same issue as Kelemen, an article in which he reads the Gauweiler saga precisely in constitutional pluralist terms (Goldmann 2016). Matthias Goldmann convincingly argued that the OMT controversy is in fact constitutional pluralism in action: it allowed two repeat-players, such as the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the European Court of Justice, to unfold their traditional ultimate claims of authority; it allowed them, at the same time, to interact, through the first preliminary ruling ever issued by the German tribunal to the court, which is a detail not to be underestimated; it allowed -albeit in harsh terms -the dialogic research of a solution through the typical pluralist approach of 'mutually assured discretion' between institutions (Goldmann 2016: 128). In Goldmann's view, this is desirable on the normative plane, but first of all it is true from a descriptive point of view, confirmed by a collective reading of the preliminary reference from Karlsruhe, the preliminary ruling from Luxembourg, and the final German decision. Without doubt, the style of the reference was questionable, and some grievances which were left untouched in the final decision are relevant: but the question was substantially positively solved at the time, and one must remember that mutual accommodation through judicial dialogue is a diachronic exercise, in which judgments talk for both present and future purposes (Faraguna 2016a). Now we know that, as of the summer of 2017, a new preliminary reference by the Bundesverfassungsgericht concerning the quantitative easing program has reached Luxembourg, XXXV it is easy to predict that those grievances left in Gauweiler will be part of a new judicial conversation and duly taken into account by the European Court of Justice.
In sum, the whole saga was constructed, or at least can be read, through the lexis of constitutional pluralism: a theory that predicts, after all, mutual institutional accommodation and the switch to the idea of pure legality to the basic principle of legitimacy (Halberstam 2010), which is visible in the case in the 'mutually assured discretion' between courts described by Goldmann and also in the Court of Justice's deference to the expertise of the European Central Bank. 
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This makes me think that his major concern is with a specific normative aspect of constitutional pluralism, of a particular typology: is constitutional pluralism desirable, in the sense that it can really lead to a fruitful mutual accommodation of competing constitutional claims through a genuine inter-institutional dialogue? In the past, this probably happened.
But today: are there any limits to it? Should we define exceptions vis-à-vis the potential danger inherent in the theory?
To reflect on these points, we firstly analyze the second current anomaly of the constitutional pluralist paradigm, in the next chapter.
The second alleged anomaly: on the uses and abuses of constitutional pluralism
Constitutional pluralism was successful and attractive -some critics say -as for a long E -140 stating that the special increment which was deemed discriminatory could be maintained, but should be paid to Slovak nationals as well as Czech, and to all EU citizens in general. 
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The case was therefore framed in the double form of a test of the respect of fundamental rights of relocated migrants and asylum seekers, and a fine tuning of the relationship between EU law obligations on national bodies, agencies, and institutions and alleged national constitutional limits. The concrete questions linked to the rights of the migrants (on the interpretation of Article XIV of the Fundamental Law) were separated from the others (on the interpretation of its Article E), and the Court decided not to examine them:
LVIII after all, as emphasized by Halmai, the only rights which needed defense in the case were 'those of the migrants and refugees, but their rights will be ignored if
Hungary exempts from the quota decision, and any other solution of the refugee and migrant crisis' (Halmai 2017a; his arguments were then developed in Halmai 2017b).
Thus, unsurprisingly, the substance of the case was reduced to an abstract review of the There was no dialogue there, not even a hidden dialogue, in search of some consistency (Martinico, Fontanelli 2008; Fontanelli, Martinico 2010) , but a plain and abusive disobedience to the canons of EU law, for purely instrumental purposes. This shows that the problem for the paradigmatic value of constitutional pluralism today is not therefore the more or less muscular use of genuine pluralistic instances, which, as exemplified by Gauweiler, can eventually find accommodation;
LXIX but a fully distorted use of constitutional pluralism and its jargon, the heterogenesis of its intents, and the unintended distorted consequences that such an abuse can create.
Albeit paradoxically, this still reinforces the descriptive/empirical claim of constitutional pluralism; however, this poses a renewed challenge for constitutional pluralism theorists, to define the proper rules of this game of mutual accommodation, in interpretative/participative terms, so that uses and abuses of constitutional pluralism can be detected, diversified, and differentially and properly treated.
Some concluding remarks
In the paper, we have tried to discuss the current value of EU constitutional pluralism as a paradigm, in times of crisis. We briefly sketched the origins of the theory and its development, its basic tenets, and also historical criticism it has met. We then passed to examine the current criticism constitutional pluralism is facing, precisely in these times of crisis: and we discussed the essentially different strands of such criticism which are indeed linked to the Euro-crisis and to Central and Eastern Europe political scenarios.
All in all, the argument proposed is that, fortunately or unfortunately, constitutional pluralism is the theory that is best able to describe the current state of affairs of EU constitutionalism. It retains, therefore, its strong empirical claim. It depicts the European phenomenon of a plurality of constitutional sources and claims of ultimate authority, and the inherent potential constitutional conflicts that are not hierarchically regulated; it also represents the discursive practice between supranational and national judicial authorities, aimed, when pluralism is properly used, at reducing the risks of constitutional conflicts, and accommodating their respective claims.
In this sense, constitutional pluralism can be considered as a paradigm because it is a 1414/2009, 1415/2009, 872/2010 e 873/2010 e 874/2010, 1655/2010, 1658/2010, 383/2011, 574/2011, 575/2011, 765/2011, 1533/2011 (1), on the disposition of the monopoly on the use of force by the police within the state and by the military towards the exterior (2), fundamental fiscal decisions on public revenue and public expenditure, the latter being particularly motivated, inter alia, by social policy considerations (3), decisions on the shaping of living conditions in a social state (4) and decisions of particular cultural importance, for example on family law, the school and education system and on dealing with religious communities (5)'. LXVI Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB, para. 68-69: 'The petitioner's question related to the transferring of third country nationals in the context of the European Union can be answered by the Constitutional Court in the framework of this procedure aimed at the interpretation of the Fundamental Law as follows. If human dignity, another fundamental right, the sovereignty of Hungary (including the extent of the transferred competences) or its self-identity based on its historical constitution can be presumed to be violated due to the exercising of competences based on Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court may examine, on the basis of a relevant petition, in the course of exercising its competences, the existence of the alleged violation'. LXVII See J. Baquero Cruz in Avbelj and Komárek 2008: 13-14: 'I wonder whether constitutional pluralism is really dominant in the academia. Maybe not. Many Community lawyers do not even know that these issues are being discussed. They do not care. And others do not dare to criticise them. There are two discourses talking past each other. In French journals, for example, you never see articles about this. In German journals, Europarecht, sometimes, but it is not mainstream. In the College of Europe in Bruges, I do not think students are taught about these things. There is a disconnection'. LXVIII BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13, par. 30. LXIX This was also the idea propounded by M. Cartabia in her lecture Europe Today: Bridges and Walls at the European Law Institute -2016 Annual Conference and General Assembly in Ferrara, 7th September 2016, available at the website https://boa.unimib.it/retrieve/handle/10281/145747/207020/Cartabia%20ELI%20Lecture%20v.1.0_final. pdf, 10: 'everything considered, Gauweiler was a remarkable and constructive example of judicial cooperation, concerning a very sensitive and crucial issue which is at the core of the present European agenda. It was the practical implementation of the idea of Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, elaborated years ago by Andreas Vosskchule, the current chief justice of the BVG. Indeed, it was an example of successful judicial dialogue; although -as it has been noticed -surely not a gentlemen's conversation'. 
